Former EU Trade Chief Warns Brussels Is Failing to Stop Chinese Import Surge
Karel De Gucht calls for aggressive trade defense as the EU-China trade deficit reaches €360 billion.
The European Union is failing to protect its industrial core from a flood of cheap Chinese imports because it refuses to leverage its massive market power, according to the bloc’s former trade chief.
Karel De Gucht, who served as European Trade Commissioner from 2010 to 2014, argues that Brussels must adopt a far more aggressive stance to rebalance its economic relationship with Beijing. During his tenure, De Gucht earned a reputation for challenging Chinese state subsidies, but his warnings went unheeded. Today, the consequences are clear: the EU’s trade deficit in goods with China has ballooned from €104 billion in 2013 to nearly €360 billion last year.
Beijing has consistently denied utilizing unfair subsidies, attributing its export dominance to superior competitiveness. However, European industries ranging from automotive to chemicals are now struggling to survive. De Gucht points out that the EU remains the single largest market for Chinese goods—giving Brussels immense leverage that it routinely fails to use. Instead of acting as a unified bloc, individual member states frequently break ranks to pursue bilateral deals, leaving themselves vulnerable to economic pressure. For instance, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez recently traveled to Beijing to court direct investment.
The current crisis closely mirrors the collapse of Europe’s solar industry a decade ago. In 2013, De Gucht attempted to impose anti-dumping duties averaging 47 percent on Chinese solar imports. In response, Beijing threatened retaliatory tariffs on European wine and luxury vehicles. Fearing economic fallout, Germany and other member states forced a compromise, allowing Chinese firms to agree to a minimum price.
The compromise failed. Europe’s largest solar manufacturer collapsed shortly after, and today, China controls nearly 90 percent of global solar photovoltaic production. The EU’s share has plummeted from roughly 30 percent in 2007 to just 0.2 percent.

A similar pattern emerged in 2014 when De Gucht was forced to drop an investigation into state subsidies for Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE. European telecom companies, fearing they would be locked out of the Chinese market, lobbied their respective governments to halt the probe. Ironically, those same European firms have since been largely shut out of China anyway due to Beijing’s domestic purchasing policies.
To prevent a similar fate for the European automotive sector, De Gucht suggests implementing strict local content requirements, such as mandating that electric vehicle imports contain at least 70 percent European components. He also advocates for the creation of an alliance of open trading nations to bypass the World Trade Organization, whose dispute settlement mechanism has been paralyzed by a long-standing US boycott.
While the European Commission has developed stronger trade defense mechanisms in recent years—including an anti-coercion tool that remains unused—De Gucht warns against delaying action. Brussels is currently drafting legislation to force supply chain diversification and establish solidarity mechanisms for member states facing Chinese retaliation. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently stated that the bloc is prepared for any scenario, with “all instruments on the table.”

However, De Gucht emphasizes that trade investigations, which currently take at least a year, are far too slow to save rapidly deteriorating industries. He argues that reclaiming Europe’s industrial sovereignty requires a return to the decisive leadership style of figures like former Commission President Jacques Delors, who spearheaded the creation of the single market.









