
Sixty-nine seconds separated the last booking in Visa’s file from the last booking in Mastercard’s. Both files stop on October 26. The layout is the same in both: 27 columns, the same placeholder text, the same CRM ID format. The researchers who read them say the pattern points to one place. Two card programs, run on one provider’s platform, copied out in a single batch.
SOCRadar parsed all 14 files in the published Visa and Mastercard archives. What the files hold is mobile numbers, bank identification number prefixes, and dated airline, hotel and restaurant bookings. The companies keep saying no payment data was taken. That part is true. The files hold no card numbers, no expiry dates, no CVVs, no passwords, no dates of birth and no home addresses. But Ensar Seker, the firm’s chief information security officer, told The Register that the detail the files do hold “is what a fraudster needs to pose as a concierge desk or a bank.”
The JPMorgan file is the one that names the richest people. Researchers who examined it found about 16,000 customer email addresses, some with phone numbers and Chase account identifiers, plus 124 bank employee addresses. All of it is tied to the Reserve program, a Visa card for clients with at least $10 million in managed assets. It is invitation only. The whole file is 502 kilobytes. Aras Nazarovas examined the data for Cybernews and said that makes the leak far more sensitive: “essentially all affected individuals can be a lucrative target to cyber criminals.” Visa’s file covers more than 6,000 premium customers across nine Asia-Pacific markets: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and Macau. It holds complete member profiles, travel and dining bookings with hotels, restaurants, cities, dates and confirmation references, and campaign engagement histories for more than 1.5 million cardmember interactions. Mastercard’s file is the smallest of the three, around 2,000 entries, and the records are so poorly structured that Cybernews flagged them as likely test data.
The customers noticed before the companies finished explaining. On Reddit’s r/PrepperIntel, u/Rexxxxxz wrote on the night of November 19: “LOL at no payment information affected. I have products from multiple of these affected companies and have gotten multiple phishing attempts in the last 4 hours claiming to be from the companies listed. ANY PERSONAL INFORMATION IS PAYMENT INFORMATION IN 2026.” His point is the one the statements keep walking around. A name, an email address, a hotel booking and a card program are enough to write a message that looks like it came from the bank itself, and the messages started arriving the same night the news broke.
All three firms describe the JPMorgan Visa Mastercard data breach in the same words, and none of them names the place it happened. Chase posted on X on November 19. Third parties providing services to the firm “were the target of a cyber attack,” the post said, and attackers “accessed certain marketing data held by those vendors, which may include some customer names and email addresses.” Visa’s version named a region instead of a vendor. The claims “are associated with an incident involving a third-party service provider in Asia Pacific,” the company said, and its own systems “were not involved and were not impacted.” Mastercard’s senior vice president Seth Eisen said the exposure was “a limited amount of email addresses — non-payments information — from a small subset of cardholders enrolled in a specific benefit program.” None of the three said which provider was hit, or when. On the same Reddit thread, u/SubstantialPressure3 asked the question the statements leave open: “What specific benefit program?” He also described what he expects next: a year of phishing texts and emails, some identity theft, and then letters offering a free year of credit monitoring “bc it’s all been quietly settled.” Outside providers were involved in 48 percent of breaches last year, according to Verizon’s 2026 report. The vendor layer is where the data lives now, and it is the layer the firms describe least.
The group behind the leak left its own paperwork lying around. SOCRadar found an open directory on a staging server in September. It held a n0n operator’s live workspace: 1,719 files, 829 scripts, five encryptor sources, and an AI coding agent configured with 154 model entries across seven providers, including models with their safety training removed. The agent wrote and debugged hundreds of attack scripts, and the billing records showed more than $7,216 in API spending by October 22. Each build of the locker uses a single hardcoded 32-byte AES key. Two builds share one key. A decryptor from one victim would likely unlock another’s files. Demands run from 0.5 to 33 bitcoin per victim. In the October port wave they reached $28 million, and opening a negotiation room costs a 10 percent upfront fee. SOCRadar collected 55 Bitcoin addresses the group uses and found no transactions on any of them as of October 16. By October 19 the group listed 93 victims with $283.7 million in demands. Check Point counted it among the top three published ransomware actors in October, with 8 percent of all published attacks. Every compromise SOCRadar documented started with weak or stolen credentials, and no vulnerability exploitation was found in any of them.
Whether this group is the one that got into Qubole is still an open question, and the people who know most about it disagree in public. Wiz, working with Sentra and Mandiant, traced a campaign that ran from October 14 to October 26. A threat actor used credentials from Qubole’s AWS account to assume roles that customers had created to trust Qubole, then read secrets and data out of their cloud environments. The roles the actor used were mostly dormant. In a majority of the environments Wiz examined, the actor’s requests were the only activity from the vendor’s account in all of October, because companies had stopped using Qubole and never removed the trust. The actor signed its sessions “quiam-enum” and “quiam-scope-full”, tested the credentials it found with a tool called TruffleHog, and in some environments downloaded entire S3 buckets in a single session. Seker told The Register the timing fits the Qubole campaign and “the files point to a concierge-services operator behind the brands.” Wiz itself is more careful. Its report notes that an actor calling itself n0n claimed the intrusion. Wiz adds that it “has not identified any ties between this campaign and other publicly reported activity.” Qubole’s parent company, Idera, did not respond to The Register’s inquiries, and the three financial firms declined to say whether Qubole was the access path.
Expedia got there first, and it is the reason the vendor theory is hard to dismiss. The travel company was listed anonymously as “Company #122” on November 3. It was named on November 9. N0n claimed about a billion records: 830 million loyalty rows, 58 million traveler profiles, 333 million account and credential records. A dataset of more than 500 megabytes was published on November 17. Expedia confirmed to Skift on November 12 that attackers had “compromised a third-party data platform provider and used its trusted access to reach systems at multiple companies,” the first of the victims to describe the route in those words. The same week, the Risky Business newsletter reported n0n claiming almost a petabyte of data from all Qubole customers, and said the group had approached Qubole privately before going public and been turned down. Expedia has not named the provider. As of November 16, no Form 8-K had been filed under the cyber incident disclosure item.
The breach landed in a week when the screens were already going dark. On Monday, November 16, n0n listed Mastercard at 07:07 Eastern, Visa at 07:08, and JPMorgan Chase at 07:09. Downdetector began recording Chase problems at 09:53, two hours and 44 minutes later, with more than 2,000 reports by 11:04 and more than 4,500 by the afternoon. Chase blamed a software bug in on-premise hardware. Transactions were posting normally by the evening, the bank said. Microsoft had been down November 12 to 14. The Federal Aviation Administration ordered a nationwide ground stop on November 13. United Airlines lost its crew systems on November 16, and the National Security Agency’s communications network went out on November 17. Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin told Fox News that night that his office had found no proof of a cyberattack and suggested the incorporation of artificial intelligence into existing infrastructure was causing the malfunctions. On Reddit, u/Excellent_Set_232 put the two Chase stories of the day in one line: “”This isn’t a cyber attack, its just an outage” “By the way, we leaked your data.””
The fatigue in the thread is older than this breach. “Add another Data Breach to the pile,” wrote u/Minimum-Situation985. His credit has been locked down for years, and he doesn’t remember which breach made him do it. “Anyone else suddenly getting a metric shit ton of scam calls and texts out of nowhere?” asked u/PissVortex9. By the researchers’ count, the published files are about 0.4 percent of what n0n claims to hold: 4.3 gigabytes, 1.9 million marketing events.





